SEN. LUGAR: And we will now proceed with our next panel. And that panel includes Dr. Patrick Clawson, the honorable Richard Murphy, Dr. Murhaf Jouejati, and Mr. Flynt Leverett.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us this morning. I would like for you to testify in the order that I introduced you. And that will be, first of all, Dr. Patrick Clawson. Will you please proceed?

MR. CLAWSON: Thank you, sir. Let me summarize my statement, please. Since assuming the Syrian presidency in June 2000 on the death of his father, Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad has established a track record. The regime change in Syria has been bad for Syria, bad for the Middle East, and bad for U.S.-Syrian relations.

In every area of concern to the United States, Bashar Assad's rule has been worse than that of his father, which is impressive, given how bad a ruler was his father. And the problems are growing, not diminishing. Let me just briefly summarize the areas where Bashar's track record has been worse than that of Hafez Assad. On the areas where we had differences with Hafez Assad, and where we had good reason to hope that Bashar would make a difference, things have gone -- gotten worse.

For instance, anti-peace process terrorism -- my boss, the director at the Washington Institute, Dennis Ross, as written in the Wall Street Journal, quote, "Hafez Assad was no slouch when it came to threatening Israel, but he controlled the flow of Iranian arms to Hezbollah and he never provided Syrian weapons directly. Bashar Assad seems to lack his father's sense of limits." End quote. Hafez Assad never met with the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Mr. Nasrallah. Bashar Assad meets with him frequently and treats him like his senior advisor and mentor.

Second, weapons of mass destruction. Rather than just maintaining the already troubling capabilities that Syria had when he came to office, Bashar Assad has plowed ahead with developing more sophisticated capabilities, worse chemical weapons, and longer range missiles.

On Lebanon, despite Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, Bashar Assad has insisted that Hezbollah retain its arms, thereby making it a destabilizing and radical force in Lebanese politics.

On economic and political reform, the great hope was that Bashar Assad would make economic growth his priority. And indeed there was a Damascus spring, with limited liberalization when he came to office, but winter set on early. For participating in civil society meetings two years ago, 10 human rights activists have been sentenced to prison for two to five years, and just this week a military court is trying 14 more human rights activists.

On the areas where Hafez Assad had some minimal cooperation with U.S. interests, things have gotten worse under Bashar. Peace negotiations with Israel -- they are completely shut down. Damascus now rarely bothers to pretend that it's willing to talk to Israel.

The issue of Iraq -- under Hafez Assad for better than 10 years, there was a "do no evil" approach, not getting in the way of U.S. policy towards Iraq. Now, instead, Bashar Assad has shown willingness to work with the worst forces in Iraq. Not only did he cooperate closely with Saddam Hussein on economic relations while Saddam was still in power, but even as Saddam's regime was falling, Bashar Assad remained friendly and provided assistance to the Saddamites.

Then, finally, there's the question of the radical Islamist terrorism. One can complain about many things about Hafez Assad, but he had a firm hand, indeed a cruel and inhuman hand towards Islam's terrorists. And Bashar Assad, I'm afraid, has changed that approach. Initially after the September 11th, 2001 attacks, Syria did cooperate with the United States against al Qaeda. But, that has not -- has changed. Ambassador Black -- Mr. Black was referring earlier to our ambiguous -- our dissatisfaction, excuse me, with the ambiguous record of the Syrians. Let me just note there was a very interesting case in Italy recently in which the Italian prosecutors, going after an al Qaeda cell, showed that Syria had, in their words, had, quote, "functioned as a hub for an al Qaeda network," end quote, and the detailed telephone wiretaps that the Italian police presented showed how this al Qaeda cell had been coordinating its activities in Syria and through Syria.

So, Bashar Assad seems to be campaigning to join the "axis of evil." He needs to be confronted with a starker choice, bigger sticks, if he persists in this path, but bigger carrots if he makes significant progress in some of the areas of our concern. Whether or not the Syrian Accountability Act becomes law, the United States has a variety of other instruments it can use to turn up the heat on Syria. The Assad regime cares deeply about statements by top U.S. officials about the legitimacy of that government, and there's much that we can do to reach out to support pro-democracy activists in Washington. It's interesting to note that in two weeks time there will be a meeting here in Washington of Syrian pro-democracy activists.

Two years ago, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy published an optimistic monograph, full of hope that Bashar Assad would improve governance, open up Syria to the outside world, let Lebanon regain its sovereignty, and make peace with Israel. That study, prepared under my direction by an Israeli scholar, showed what an opportunity Bashar Assad had. He has not made good use of his first three years. Let us hope that if faced with starker choices between a better future and real risks for his regime, he will make better use of the coming years.

Thank you, sir.

SEN. LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Clawson. Ambassador Richard Murphy.

MR. RICHARD MURPHY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the invitation to speak to the committee. My statement has been submitted for the record. I'll only touch on its highlights.

Syria has been a perennial source of frustration for successive American administrations, which have nonetheless seen fit to stay in as close touch as possible, knowing that Damascus could play a key role in the general Arab-Israeli peace process. There is a great deal of mutual frustration, and our meeting today takes place at a time when there is regrettably little prospect for forward movement on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Syria nonetheless, well, as Dr. Clawson said, it is sensitive to statements by American leaders, and it very much values a continued dialogue with the United States. It would, I know, welcome a renewed peace process. But our dialogue is so often a dialogue of the deaf. We see Syria as unresponsive to our demands that it curb terrorism. Syria considers that our Middle East policy is so biased towards Israel that we blur any distinction between actions of terrorists and those engaged in actions of national resistance. They would cooperate us -- cooperate with us on al Qaeda, but not on Palestinian terrorists, or not on the Lebanese Hezbollah. And second, they complain that we play down how insecure Syria and others feel in the Arab world in facing Israel, the region's superpower.

While it's negotiating approach is influenced by, of course, by the history of its dismemberment, that is the territorial losses it suffered between the two world wars at the hands of Britain and France, it partially explains its long-standing conviction that Israel itself was established as part of the game of imperialism to divide the Arabs. It nourishes the view that Israel remains expansionist, and it argues that a general Middle East peace could have been achieved long ago had the Arabs only stuck together.

Well, this year, Ambassador Burns talked about our -- the accumulation of frustrations, how frustration, how irritation blew up over events connected with Iraq and the war. The administration's withdrawal of its earlier objections to the Syrian Accountability Act is one of the tangible measures of its current attitude. The new problems were over issues of military supplies reaching Iraq from Syria before the war, and its presumed encouragement of fighters crossing the border since the war to target our troops. Intelligence is apparently mixed, both on this latter issue and whether Syria received stocks of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the war.

Now, the president has disavowed any intent to invade Syria, but Syria, being frequently described as on the wrong side of terrorism, there is certainly an appetite for regime change in some quarters of this administration. The removal of the Saddam Hussein regime was actually a political plus for Damascus, eliminating a rival to its leadership claims in the Arab east, but a major economic loss in terms of the benefits received from discounted Iraqi oil.

What can Syria do to redirect its policies offensive to the United States? Certainly the list would include improving their border controls, avoiding encouragement of fighters seeking to transit Syria for Iraq, and control over both extremists Palestinian organizations, including expelling their leaders, and ensure that Hezbollah does not trigger a major conflict with Israel. I think the Syrian leadership has been in part constrained by the presence of 400,000 Palestinians in Syria and how they treat their leaders.

What should be our policy direction? First and foremost would be to find a way to revive the peace process. Syrian anxiety at being overlooked tempts it to tolerate and perhaps even encourage the acts of Palestinian extremists and Hezbollah. Second, I'd like to suggest a different way of dealing with Syrian weapons of mass destruction programs. Their extent, I don't know. Certainly, their chemical program has been talked of for 20 years -- nothing new. But that we go beyond our rhetorical support for Middle East -- the Middle East region, free of weapons of mass destruction, to launch actual negotiations for a regional approach to their control.

Our current policy is to pursue controls on a state-by-state basis, excluding Israel, and we have tended to assume that Israel would fiercely oppose a regional approach, preferring to avoid any discussion of its weapons of mass destruction arsenal. But I think it's time to reexamine this in the light of what caught my attention, a recent article in the Los Angeles Times, that Israel was considering placing nuclear-tipped warheads on its missiles in its submarines.

Now, the sources were anonymous, easily deniable, and they were quickly denied. But they suggest a tantalizing hint that Israel just might be ready to use awareness of its arsenal in a new way. Could this mean that it might be prepared to go beyond the position of Prime Minister Rabin in the mid-'90s that Israel would sign the NPT two years after a regional peace had been achieved, and that would include more than the Arab world?

Verification procedures for a regional free zone would have to meet the most demanding standards. Further U.S. bilateral guarantees of Israel security would probably be required. But I have offered this suggestion believing that any approach that might restrain the rush throughout the region, and we've been worried sick ever since it started in South Asia and moved west, to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological warfare capabilities should be explored.

The risk of a broader conflict must always be in the minds of our policy makers. Israel's October 5 attack on the terrorist training center in Syria was warning that further actions could come and the problem could escalate. And it could also help rebuild our credentials as a dependable, fair-minded mediator in the Middle East.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Ambassador Murphy. The chair would like to recognize now Dr.

MR. JOUEJATI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for inviting me to be here today.

What brings me here also is a love for my native Syria, and my love for my being a U.S. citizen, of which I am very proud. This love for the two, though, is mixed with a lot of frustration, all the more so that I think the U.S. and Syria have really at the end of the day the same objectives, which is peace and stability in the Middle East.

What I will do here, again, since it is in my written testimony, I will just over, and in very general terms, in the hopes that we can get to specifics in the question and answer session. But before I do, may I just correct just a few misconceptions that I have heard this morning.

Certainly, with respect to the Syrian economy, Syria is gradually liberalizing its economy. Syria seeks membership in the WTO. Syria has several free trade agreements with numerous Arab countries, and Syria is currently negotiating with the EU to become an associate partner in the year 2010.

Yes, there are U.S.-Syrian tensions. Certainly, there are U.S.- Syrian tensions, but I think these have first and foremost to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and as Senator Boxer said earlier, the truth will set you free. I think it has to do with U.S. support to Israel, despite Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories, and this despite the United Nations resolutions.

We explored what is wrong with the Syrian approach. Let us, if I may, let us also explore what may be wrong with the U.S. approach towards Syria.

When we in the United States use the old stick approach with Syria, the best we can get is half-hearted cooperation. This is true in Lebanon. And although there has been to date four deployments of Syrian troops, although Syria has kept the peace in Lebanon for quite a long time, although Syria has put the lid on Palestinian fighters in Palestinian refugee camps, and also curtailed Hezbollah activities in the south of Lebanon, Syria needs to withdraw from Lebanon. And so it is a half-hearted cooperated.

In Iraq, there is Syrian cooperation with the United States, and this General Petrias (sp) can talk more about it than I. Syria is, for example, supplying electricity to the north of Iraq, specifically Mosul. We can talk also to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who is the top British official in the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq, who has very recently said that he was astounded by Syrian cooperation, but there too we have a problem with Syria. Yes, Syria did -- or at least there was smuggling across the border of night vision equipment and so on. With terrorism we have a major problem. Part of the problem is that Syria and the Arab world and the third world at large simply do not see it the way we see it, this question of Palestinian, quote- unquote, "terrorism," when the Palestinians are defending their legitimate rights to determine their future. But on the question of terrorism, here the distinction becomes very clear. Syria has been probably one of the closest partners with the United States in the war against al Qaeda, so much so that senior American officials, including this morning, have said that Syria has saved American lives.

By using your stick, Mr. Chairman, we are unwittingly delaying the reforms in Syria that we are hoping for. We are, unwittingly, uniting the new guard and the old guard, and there is -- there is that division in Syria between new guard and old guard, and as we are applying this stick to Syria, this can only bring them together in fear. We are uniting the states and society, whereas there was a gap between state and society, and society now increasingly -- is increasingly vocal in demanding change in Syria by applying pressure to Syria, which is seen on the street as doing Israel's bidding. It is only delaying that movement of democratization.

The case of point of the U.S. stick delaying reforms in Syria is a very recent cabinet reshuffle in Syria in which President Assad wanted to make major changes, including the appointment of a not Ba'athist prime minister, a man who is the president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce. According to my information, President Assad wanted to overhaul the whole foreign policy apparatus, but this had not been done at the end of the day, and he appointed, again, an old guardist, in order not to seem, or to give to the appearance, that he is bowing to American pressure.

Furthermore, using the stick against Syria is going to further aggravate Arab public opinion, which is already very inflamed at our unconditional supports to Israel and our occupation of Iraq. It is going to give this stick against Syria to give further ammunition to Islamic fundamentalists. Again, the Syria Accountability Act is going to be seen as the U.S. doing Israel's war against Arabs and Muslims.

And finally, that stick against Syria and that anti-Syrian rhetoric that is coming out of Washington is going to -- and I hope not -- but to bring the Middle East to the precipice. And the case in point is that this has encouraged Israel to strike deep inside Syria, as it had on October 5th, and although Syria was restrained, the Israelis have threatened more strikes, at which point I think Bashar Assad would be under tremendous pressure to reply in kind, and this will set off a spiral of violence that we will not be able to control.

Mr. Chairman, if we want Syria's total cooperation, we can get it, and we can -- all we need to do is to convince Syria that its security interests are not threatened. This, not only with words, but by deeds. This entails the resumption of the Middle East process, based on Resolution 242, based on the Saudi plan, which all the Arab states have accepted, and which the U.S. has endorsed. And then when the U.S. uses the stick with the recalcitrants, either Arab or Israeli, then we might move the region toward peace. Then there will be no more terror. Then we will be doing Israel a favor, as its security policy has failed. Then we will do Syria and the Arabs a favor. And most of all, Mr. Chairman, we will be doing ourselves a favor.

Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Jouejati. Mr. Leverett.

MR. LEVERETT: Mr. Chairman, like the other members of the panel, I've submitted my full statement for the record. I'll just touch on a few points here.

I would submit that today the United States does not really have a policy towards Syria -- if by policy we mean a series of measures and initiatives rooted in a strategy for changing Syrian behaviors that are inimical to our interests and eliciting more constructive behavior from the Syrian regime.

Let me very briefly put a little bit of historical perspective on that. During the '90s, from the Madrid Conference in 1991 until the summit between President Clinton and the late Hafez al-Assad in March 2000, the way that we thought about a strategy towards Syria was in the context of the Syrian track with the Middle East peace process. It was assumed that once we got Syria and Israel to do the deal, that all of our bilateral concerns with Syria, particularly those related to its state sponsorship of terrorism, would be taken care of in the context of that agreement. But, of course, that agreement never came. And with the effective collapse of the Syria track in 2000, we have been left adrift in our policy towards Syria, without a strategy, without a sense of how to accomplish what it is we want to accomplish with Syria.

I would suggest that -- and I would respectfully disagree with Ambassador Murphy and Dr. Jouejati on this -- that it is a mistake to make the basis for a new strategy towards Syria a resumption of the Syrian track of the Middle East peace process. As important as I think that a peace between Syria and Israel would be for the region and for U.S. interests in the region, I think the reality is we're not going to have a meaningful Syria track anytime soon. Given what else is going on in the region, given the composition and the positions of the present Israeli government, we are not going to be able to restart the Syria track on terms that are going to have any meaning for the Syrian regime.

I think what we need is a strategy that will let us accomplish our policy goals towards Syria without waiting for a climate that is more conducive to a resumption of the Syria track.

I would pick up on something that Patrick Clawson said. We need both bigger sticks and bigger carrots with regard to Syria, if we are going to construct such a strategy. There's been a lot of discussion of sticks with regard to Syria. The Syria Accountability Act is very much oriented in that direction. I don't hear very much discussion nowadays about carrots for Syria, and I think that's a serious deficiency in the policy debate right now. If we're not willing to talk about, with specificity, the carrots as well as the sticks, we are never really going to be able to modify Syrian behavior. Both when I was in government, and even more since I've left government, and in some ways am able to speak more freely with Syrians and others in the region, the consistent message that I hear from Syria with regard to our policy differences with the regime in Damascus is you keep telling us you want us to change our behavior, but you won't tell us what's in it for us if we do. I think we should make it clear both what is in it for Syria is it behaves more constructively, and what will happen to them if they don't behave more constructively.

Let me suggest a couple of areas and how this approach might work in those areas. With regard to terrorism and Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, that designation is imminently justified by the record of Syrian behavior. But all we do, frankly in terms of engaging Syria on this is to reiterate over and over the same list of complaints and tell them we want them to stop. I think we need to create, to use a word that has been taken over for other purposes, but I'll use it here: We need a road map for Syria on the terrorism issue. We should be very clear we want them to do the following steps: expel these leaders, close these offices, stop these activities. But also indicate that if they were to do those things in a way that was verifiable, and we were confident they had done them, that we would be prepared to take Syria off the state sponsors list, because at that point Syria would effectively be out of the terrorism business, as far as the United States was concerned. Both carrots and sticks.

Similarly, on Iraq, and getting them to take a more cooperative stance toward what we are doing in Iraq, I couldn't agree more with Senator Biden's suggestion they what we need is an analog to the 6- plus-2 framework that was I think very, very helpful to us in late 2001, early 2002 in dealing with Afghanistan. We need an analog for that with regard to Iraq. I think that would be good for our own interests in Iraq. But in the context of today's topic, I think it would be an important way of reassuring the Syrians that what we are doing in Iraq is not directed against their interests, and that in fact their regional interests could be accommodated in what we are trying to do in Iraq. We need both carrots and sticks.

With regard to the Syria Accountability Act, I certainly welcome and encourage the efforts to put a national security waiver in. I think if people are looking for other ways to increase the range of flexibility that is granted to the executive in implementing the act, assuming that it passes, I would also consider putting in sunset provisions with the measures -- put a time limit in, and at that point the executive and the Congress are going to have to revisit the situation and see if these kinds of measures are still appropriate.

Just in closing, will such an approach, the kind of approach I've indicated, really work with the Syrians, particularly given some of the things we've heard about Bashar al-Asad today? I think that there are a number of competing images of Bashar al-Asad in public discourse about Syria today. You head one from Patrick Clawson: Bashar is essentially the loyal son of the regime -- may in fact be even more ideological, more anti-American in his orientation than his late father. You head another from Mr. Jouejati that Bashar is someone who really does want to take Syria in a more constructive direction, but is hemmed in by an old guard. Particularly in Israeli analytical circles you hear a third view: Bashar is simply inexperienced, not up to the job, doesn't really know what he is doing.

I could argue the case for any one of those three views of Bashar with a sort of selective application of evidence. I think that what this suggests is that the Bashar situation is very, very complicated, and that if we are going to engage him, if we are going to get anything more than tactical adjustments in Syrian behavior, we are going to have to be very clear, very explicit about what we want him to do, but also very clear about both rewards and benefits, depending on the choices that he makes. Thank you very much.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Leverett. We will have questions now of the panel, and Senator Biden and I will go back and forward. I would suggest that we try maybe eight minute and we'll alternate.

Mr. Leverett, let me proceed with your thoughts. I was following intently the thought of carrots. And someone said earlier in some part of our dialogue that we should have larger carrots, larger sticks. Try to sharpen if you can even further the carrots. In other words, I am not certain I have a clear perception of what it is that we ought to be doing that is more attractive; for example, the second carrot idea on Iraq -- maybe many countries are confused about our policy in Iraq, although as Americans we don't see much confusion. We are struggling mightily with our coalition partners to try to bring about a regime of human rights, of democracy, of some freedom for the people economically of the country -- a new idea, which some countries around might find dangerous -- ideas that could spread and could lead to instability of situations that are not like that at all.

Now, it would appear that we are being opposed from day to day by people who may be a part of the previous regime of Saddam, maybe persons coming in from other countries who want to join the war against terror on the side of whoever is trying to disrupt this, you know, of the killings of the U.N. people, the Red Cross people, of innocent Iraqis, quite apart from targets of American soldiers -- are extremely violent and fairly consistent.

So when we approach Syria and say, We think you ought to be on our side on this, and there's ambivalence, to say the least this is confusing for us, however confusing it may be for the Syrians. So try on for size again the Iraq situation. How do we have a carrot there that is meaningful?

MR. LEVERETT: I think to put it in context from the Syrian perspective, one of the chronic concerns of the Syrian regime -- this certainly goes back to the time of Hafez al-Asad, but I think it very much continues in the way that Bashar and the people around him look at the regional situation. The biggest fear from Damascus's standpoint is one of regional marginalization, that the United States is going to be able over time literally to encircle Syria with a series of pro-Western regimes. You have Israel and you have the whole history of efforts to broker a separate piece with Lebanon. You have Jordan now very firmly in the American camp; Saudi Arabia, go on around the region. And now you've had Iraq flip over in a big way to --

SEN. LUGAR: What would be wrong with that? Why isn't that in the best interests of the world for that to happen?

MR. LEVERETT: Because at that point, if the Syrian track of the peace process is still unresolved, there's no, from a Syrian perspective, there is no particular reason why the United States or the rest of the world really has to pay attention to that issue. The United States would have the strategic position that it wanted, Syria is in no position on its own to threaten Israeli strategic interests in a fundamental way. And at that point Syria could be ignored. And I think that is the biggest fear, that a Syrian leader has. And what something like a 6-plus-2 framework for Iraq could do in helping us manage the Syrian relationship is helping assuage that concern and helping the Syrian leadership understand that we in fact do want to accommodate their legitimate regional interests as part of what we are trying to do in the region.

SEN. LUGAR: Well, let's say that we did try to understand their legitimate interests, which might be settlement of the Golan Heights dilemma, for example. Can you parse that type of activity as to simply straight antipathy to Israel, in which finally you know you can try to work out various things pragmatically, but still the Syrian leadership may be influenced by the streets, or maybe the other way around -- I don't know, maybe both, to just simply say we don't like Israel. As a matter of fact, we just wish they were not there.

And therefore we get back again and again to the fact that why are you in the United States interested in an Israel that is finally accepted by everybody and lives in peace and negotiated, as opposed to taking an position of indifference, that Israelis just have to fend for themselves, and the United States will not be involved. And is there any way ever out of that kind of dilemma, simply working through the other elements of settlement of the Syrian situation?

MR. LEVERETT: I believe that there is, senator. I think that as a result of the work that was done during the 1990s on the Syrian track that we understand very well what the requirements are for peace that would meet Syrian needs on return of territory, full withdrawal of Israel from the Golan, and Israel's needs for security guarantees and normal relations with Damascus afterwards. We know what that agreement would look like. We're just simply not in a position at this point to deliver on that or try to make it happen in a very feasible way.

I think that the Syrians, without any great altruism toward Israel, have basically made the calculation that over the long run that is in their interests; that is the best deal that they could hope for strategically to help their place in the region, and help their position with us. And I think that if we get back into an environment in which the kind of deal I was talking about would be feasible, the Syrians would go for it.

SEN. LUGAR: That point of view is an important one, and it's held by a good number of people who have studied this area a long time, in the same way that some of the same people hold the view that we know what a Palestinian-Israeli settlement would look like. We've been down that trail many, many times before. So in other words, in our minds' eyes we have an idea of what settlement is.

But then you get back to the problem of, nevertheless, even though we pronounce a road map strategy and we even get some steam generated behind that, why rapidly whether we know how it all ought to come out or not, it's off track, and we're back to the situation in which you have all described today, which to say the least is disheartening.

Let me ask Dr. Clawson, in your analysis of the new leadership you were more bleak about that than perhaps your panel members and maybe correctly so. But if this is a new regime, a new president that has problems which are even greater, why is he likely or what might bring him back into this framework that we are talking about, in which we sort of realize some objectives from the past, and finally deal with the reality and move on. Is that in the cards at all with this leadership?

MR. CLAWSON: I would be very pessimistic about progress soon on the Syrian-Israeli peace, because as all of us has emphasized, Bashar has found it extremely difficult to break with the old guard of the past. And for him to accept a deal which his father refused would be dynamite in the Syrian political scene. And since the deal which in fact Hafez al-Asad refused when offered him by President Clinton in Geneva, in the spring of the year 2000, was extraordinarily close to what it was the Syrians have long told us they would insist on, and involved extraordinarily extensive Israeli withdrawals. I think it would be very difficult -- very difficult for Bashar to make progress on this front. And we're optimistic on some of other fronts though. I think there is some real prospects that we could make progress on the Lebanon issue, on Hezbollah, on Iraq. And I think that could create an environment where down the road we could imagine getting back to the kind of Geneva deal, which is about the best that we are going to see for the Syrians.

SEN. LUGAR: Oh, you might make headway there. In other words, it's not just a question that the new leader has to be there for quite a long while before he consolidates his own authority, confidence, and what have you?

MR. CLAWSON: That would help, but I also think he could consolidate his authority and confidence in his rule faster if he can show that he can deliver on some of these other issues, and get some of the carrots that Flynt was mentioning. And I would quite agree with him. My great concern is at the moment Bashar doesn't believe there's any sticks in the United States. He looks at what happened with the oil pipeline from Iraq, where we talked tough and we didn't do a darn thing about it, and he directly lied to Colin Powell about it, and yet there were no consequences as far as he could see. He continued to get the revenue. So he doesn't believe there's any sticks from us, and he doesn't believe there's any carrots from us. So he doesn't see any reason to change his behavior.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you. Senator Biden?

SEN. BIDEN: Dr. Jouejati, you and Mr. Clawson come at this completely differently. You basically say that you have to get the Palestinian-Israeli track, the Israeli-Syrian track settled, before you are going to make any progress in these other things. And Dr. Clawson, unless I misunderstand him, says it's going to work the other way: You will be able to get some progress moving the other day before you get to the Golan. Could you, because you seem very certain in what you are saying -- could you tell us what you think Syria believes it needs in order to, quote, "do a deal"? I mean, what is it that you believe -- how far would the Israelis have to go to get yes for an answer in terms of at least the Israeli-Syrian relationship?

MR. JOUEJATI: Thank you, Senator Biden. Israel would have to not so much please the whims of Syria, but to abide by U.N. resolutions.

SEN. BIDEN: No, I got that. Look, let's -- we have an old expression where I come from -- let's not kid a kidder. We all know what the U.N. resolutions are. I'd like you to be as specific with me as you were on other parts of your views about Syria. What specifically is it? Is it -- I mean, can you describe it -- not in the context of U.N. resolutions - in the context of concrete action that you believe would have to occur in order for Syria to say we've got a deal with Israel?

MR. JOUEJATI: To withdraw totally to the June 4th lines of 1967 from the Golan Heights, and to see on the Palestinian-Israeli track at least some positive developments that might lead in the end to the establishment of a Palestinian state, very much in conformity with the vision of President Bush.

This is a long-standing Syrian demand, and where I do disagree with Dr. Clawson when he says about the old guard and the new guard here, on this very issue, I believe the old guard and the new guard are very, very much united, and President Asad, the late President Asad, had he been able to obtain from the Israelis that commitment to withdraw to the June 4th lines, I think there would have been peace between Syria and Israel. I don't think Bashar al-Asad cannot accept any less though --

SEN. BIDEN: Excuse me, then, what you just said contradicts that. You just said there'd have to be the total withdrawal and there would have to be progress -- whatever, not defined -- progress with regard to the rest of the issue with the Palestinians.

MR. JOUEJATI: Correct. In other words, Syria -- Syria, by virtue of its past, by virtue of its national role conception as the champion of Arab rights, cannot be seen, I believe, because this would hurt the legitimacy of the regime, cannot be seen as operating in isolation, as having a separate peace treaty with Israel.

SEN. BIDEN: Got you. So this notion of two tracks is one that goes to a dead end from your standpoint? There is no possibility of a two-track solution, unless the second track simultaneously ends where the first track ends, and consistent with what the Syrians think is the appropriate settlement, correct?

MR. JOUEJATI: Well, let me try to be more clear than I have been. I think -- and I may be wrong -- that President Asad, when he went to Geneva to meet with President Clinton to talk about all this, I think at the end of the day he would not have signed a peace treaty. He would have waited for further development on the Palestinian track. But from his, from his angle, from his Syrian angle, he would have been satisfied that Israel had delivered to Syria what Syria demands. And I think the same applies to this president.

SEN. BIDEN: But would the former Asad and the present one do if that were delivered? I mean, you know, delivery is a two-way street. What delivery would come? Would they cease and desist supporting Hezbollah? Would they call effectively a time-out while the negotiation went on? Would they, as for example the practical -- I mean, I'm not trying to be argumentative -- I'm trying to understand -- practically speaking that you could have a circumstance where you had a -- let me put it this way: Hezbollah and Syria have two different agenda. Hezbollah's clear agenda is no Israel, period. And now that I assume is not Syria's agenda. Syria's agenda is a settlement between -- that's fair, the establishment of a Palestinian state that is free and fairly arrived at, and total withdrawal to the pre-June border, the June 4 borders before the war on the Golan.

But my dilemma here is that when folks like you talk to me about this -- I mean from both perspectives -- is that you never connect all the dots. There's a third dot, and the third dot that matters most to Israel: assuming Israel were acting from your perspective much more rationally, is that terror cease and desist, and support for terror cease and desist.

But it is clear that the Jihad and Hezbollah have made it very clear, it will not cease and desist, period, until there is no Israel. They're not signed on to a two-state solution. They've not signed on to the notion that there would be any compromise on Jerusalem, compromise on anything.

And so it seems to me your prescription for how to proceed with Syria is fundamentally flawed. Explain to me why I'm wrong about that.

MR. JOUEJATI: Senator, what Syria will give in return -- you asked what will Syria deliver. That is the normalization of relations with Syria. And normalization here -- and it has been talked about between Syrians and Israelis on the official level -- would be the establishment of diplomatic relations, with an Israeli embassy in Damascus, with an Israeli flag there waving over it.

SEN. BIDEN: That would be a wonderful thing, as long as, with the flag waving over it, they weren't still funding and supporting Hezbollah. Let's get to Hezbollah.

MR. JOUEJATI: Moreover, Syria will have a mutual security arrangement with Israel on the Golan Heights.

SEN. BIDEN: Yeah.

MR. JOUEJATI: There will be a joint water-sharing mechanism on --

SEN. BIDEN: Got that.

MR. JOUEJATI: -- Lake Tiberias. And when there is peace, Senator, between Syria and Israel, there is no need for PIJ to have an office in Damascus. There is no need for Hamas to --

SEN. BIDEN: Wait a minute. Why is there no need? Because, remember what the second part of your equation here is, that the Palestinian track has to be won since they view themselves, the Syrians, as the leader of the Arab world in the region, is that the Palestinians have to be satisfied. And yet you have the very people they're funding now saying there is no satisfaction available short of elimination of the state of Israel. So that's what confuses me.

MR. JOUEJATI: No, I don't think there is any room for confusion. Israel -- Syria, rather -- Syria has accepted de facto Israel within its '67 boundaries, and so have all the Arab states.

SEN. BIDEN: I know, I know, I know.

MR. JOUEJATI: There are marginal groups, Senator, like Hamas and PIJ and so on.

SEN. BIDEN: Yeah, the ones that they are supporting. In other words, what gets them to stop supporting those groups?

MR. JOUEJATI: What stops them -- what gets them to stop supporting these groups is peace with Israel, and that assumes Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories.

SEN. BIDEN: Notwithstanding the fact that is not sufficient for the very groups they're supporting.

MR. JOUEJATI: These groups, as far as Syria is concerned, and I think as far as all Arab states are concerned, would then occupy a very, very marginal position. Inside Syria, it would then be illegal for any group that wants to wage war against Israel to exist on Syrian soil.

SEN. BIDEN: Well, that's kind of encouraging, because the truth of the matter is, you know, Israel doesn't have much to worry about from Syria except their support for terrorist groups. I mean, what the hell difference does it make to Israel whether or not it has peace with Syria but for that issue? I mean, what flows from there other than that?

And so that seems to me to be the ultimate -- I mean, you know, we talk about carrots and sticks. We talk about who needs what. Syria very much wants to regain its self-respect, wants to regain the Golan, wants Israel off, quote, "its territory." I understand that part of the equation.

But I don't know what, absent an up-front acknowledgement, if that occurs, there will be a ceasing and desisting of -- you know, in my conversations in Syria, the kind of things I heard -- we all hear all kinds of conversations, Mr. Ambassador; we all get told different things -- it's not a monolithic voice that comes out of Damascus or any country -- is that the fact of the matter is that we cannot be seen as letting down the Palestinians.

And the voice of Mr. Arafat now and the voice of Hezbollah and the voice of the Fatah and the voice is simply one that suggests right now that there is no -- there's no outline for peace that falls into the framework of all those groups. You know, there is an outline for peace that falls in the framework of the negotiation of the vast majority of Palestinians. And everybody knows what they are.

I mean, like you said, Mr. Leverett, everybody knows what is needed in these various deals. Everybody knows there's got to be compromise on Jerusalem, not absolute. Everybody knows there's got to be elimination of the vast majority of the settlements but compromise on the remaining of some of the settlements. Everybody knows there -- everybody knows the pieces. Everybody knows there can't be an absolute right of return.

Yet those basic points are fundamentally rejected by -- they're non-starters for the very groups that are blowing up people right now. And so I don't -- I find it -- I have lost, quite frankly, faith in the credibility of Mr. Arafat and/or Mr. Assad and others without their up-front acknowledgement that they're the elements that are willing to negotiate, which is a de facto disagreement with the very people that are blowing folks up.

Anyway, I'm taking too much time, but I find it -- and I also have -- I mean, carrots and sticks. It is self-evident that if they stop supporting these groups, Mr. Leverett, they'll be taken off the terrorist list. They know that. How is that a carrot? How is that a carrot? I don't get that.

I don't see any carrots here you all are offering. And the sticks you're offering are ones that I think you've all figured out. Assad knows the stick's not going to be -- this president has no capacity, as a political matter, to invade Syria now.

MR. LEVERETT: Senator, don't underestimate how much Mr. Assad cares about the kind of rhetorical stance that we take. And the kind of coverage that has been given to the deliberations in Congress over the Syrian Accountability Act indicates that Damascus is hypersensitive to the kinds of things we have to say.

And I think that Damascus, for instance --

SEN. BIDEN: Give me any evidence of that, based on their conduct.

MR. LEVERETT: What we heard from the first panel was that in the last few weeks there has been greater cooperation around the question of the $3 billion in funds and about border control. And I think that that is distinctly related to the progress that the Syrian Accountability Act (has had?) through Congress.

SEN. BIDEN: I see zero evidence of that. The evidence of that relates to the progress being taken on the ground in the regions that we are occupying in the areas that they have been cooperating. I think you guys are smoking something. I mean, I don't see this at all. I mean, I think this is like an academic exercise at a great university about how we write the term paper.

I mean, I really think there's very little connection to reality here, because the converse is true. If, in fact, they were worried about our actions and Congress's actions and the president's threats, there would have been a continuum of the cooperation that began immediately after, immediately after we invaded Iraq, which then there was some accountability, because they really were worried that the voices of the Richard Perles and the Wolfowitzes and the neocons may, in fact, be not an echo but be the voice of America. And there were 120,000 troops sitting on their northern border, and they were worried they would pivot and move south.

Once they figured out there was no possibility of them pivoting anywhere, all of a sudden things began to change. At least I think that. That's presumptuous of me to say. I don't know that any more than you know that there's been any movement based upon the Syrian Accountability Act. I mean, it's -- anyway, I'm frustrated, as you can see, but I'm sure you all are from a lifetime of dealing with it.

SEN. LUGAR: Let me start my questioning just by responding or rather allowing each of you to speak. Dr. Jouejati?

MR. JOUEJATI: May I, Senator? On the question of Iraq, I think Syrian cooperation has been increasing in the past. And what the Syrians are comforted by is that they are seeing now the beginnings of a timetable. This is especially true --

SEN. BIDEN: Let's get this straight. There is no straight-line cooperation. There is no straight-line cooperation. Let's get it straight now. There is cooperation in some areas and less cooperation in other areas. There is no straight line here, factually. There is none.

MR. JOUEJATI: Factually, Senator, first of all, the assets that the Iraqis have are reported to be far less than $3 billion. This is number one. And two, according to my understanding and to the information I have, yesterday a senior official of the Department of Defense invited the Syrian charge d'affaires in Washington to thank him for Syria's cooperation on that score, on freezing of the assets.

SEN. BIDEN: Well, they froze the assets. Then they drew down the assets to pay off what was owed to them by the Iraqis. And now they're ready to talk about the rest of the assets. That seems to me to be logical. But it doesn't demonstrate a newfound cooperation.

MR. JOUEJATI: The newfound cooperation is, of course, in the presence of those Treasury Department folks who are in Damascus and who have talked with the Central Bank of Syria folks. And as a result, we have now, at least in the Department of Defense, some happy people, according to them and the Syrian charge d'affaires. This is on one level.

On the other level, again, I can only speak to what General Petreas (ph) is saying -- my information is not from the Syrian government -- and also to Sir Jeremy Greenstock. And they seem to be very happy with Syrian cooperation, first on the score of trying to stop the jihadists from going to Iraq -- and the Syrians do not succeed all the time because it is a long and porous border and because they do not have the necessary resources. And, two, again, Syria -- and it's making money out of it, of course, but it is providing the area of Mosul electricity. And that has a stabilizing effect.

So, again, Syrian cooperation -- Syria's increased cooperation, if I want to be more accurate, on the score of Iraq -- is as a result that now there is a comfort that the United States has a timetable for a constitution and for this and that. And this was not the case earlier.

SEN. BIDEN: I hope you're right. There's decreased cooperation in al Qaeda. There's decreased cooperation in other areas. But it's kind of interesting. But go ahead.

SEN. LUGAR: Ambassador Murphy, will you --

MR. MURPHY: Just a brief comment, Mr. Chairman. I hear Senator Biden almost saying that he cannot foresee any way that Hamas and Jihad can ever change. Well, I do.

SEN. BIDEN: Oh, yeah. I am saying that.

MR. MURPHY: Yeah. Well, you know, you've asked if we're smoking. No, it's federal premises; we're not smoking. (Laughter.) We try to clear that air.

The fact is, I look at Avigdor Lieberman, sitting on the opposition bench in the Knesset, and now actually in the cabinet, who has had a lifelong commitment to the expulsion of every last Palestinian from Israel. I foresee a day when there is a peace agreement between the Palestinians --

SEN. BIDEN: You're comparing him to Hamas and Jihad?

MR. MURPHY: I'm comparing his absolute view that that is the solution for Israel with the Hamas view that Israel shouldn't exist.

SEN. BIDEN: I see.

MR. MURPHY: And one day there will be a Palestinian parliament. They will be in opposition. But there will be peace. And both the -- and there will only be peace if the Palestinian leadership and countries like Syria exert the control to keep them from doing more than making speeches on the opposition bench.

SEN. BIDEN: Well, I agree with that. That doesn't constitute a change in their attitude.

MR. MURPHY: Today there is -- I mean, look closely also at the Hezbollah situation. The operetta continues. Where? On that tiny section of the Lebanese-Israeli border of the Shaba farms. It's not raging up and down the Lebanese-Israeli frontier.

SEN. BIDEN: Why?

MR. MURPHY: Is it self-control of --

SEN. BIDEN: Why?

MR. MURPHY: I don't know.

SEN. BIDEN: I think I do. I think you do.

MR. MURPHY: I think it's a combination of Syrian pressure.

SEN. BIDEN: Bingo.

MR. MURPHY: I think it's a combination maybe of Hezbollah's own interests within Lebanon politics.

SEN. BIDEN: Bingo.

MR. MURPHY: Iran -- I don't know. You have one on Iran?

SEN. BIDEN: No, I think those are fully sufficient. Some might argue that was the case because Israel may decide to go beyond what they did, speaking of sticks.

SEN. LUGAR: Dr. Clawson.

MR. CLAWSON: At an Arab summit two years ago, Bashar Assad is reported to have told the Arab leaders that they can ignore the words coming out of Washington because Washington's words don't mean very much and the United States doesn't do very much to back up either its threats or its promises.

I think that's very much an attitude that he has displayed over the last two years. It's very hard for us to get his attention and to take very seriously what we say either way about sticks or carrots. So it's important that we measure our words and that we find a way to demonstrate our credibility to this fellow, who unfortunately doesn't take us very seriously.

To the extent that he does take us seriously, then I think that we can get some degree of cooperation out of him through a combination of sticks and carrots. But at the moment, we have quite low credibility with him because he doesn't think we carry through very much on what we say.

And the episode with the oil pipeline from Iraq has hurt us very, very badly in that regard, because he was making an awful lot of money off that pipeline, and he directly promised the secretary of State that that pipeline would not be opened until the money was put under the U.N. And he knew the secretary of State had the president woken up to be told this wonderful news.

And yet, when Bashar paid no attention to that, there was no consequence in the United States. It would not have been hard for us to bomb the pumping stations inside Iraq and to shut that pipeline down. We didn't do it. And as a result, we have very little credibility with this guy. And it's going to take a long time to re- establish that credibility.

But I would hope that we can do that by offering measured and small, small sticks, which is all we're doing with the Syria Accountability Act. And I would offer some small carrots. And I suggested some, like computer education and even potentially discussing debt relief; meanwhile, coordinating with the Europeans, who've got this great big carrot that they're dangling in front of the Syrians at the moment, this trade association agreement that they've been negotiating for a decade.

For gosh sakes, let's persuade the Europeans that before they sign that, get something from the guy based on what the Europeans have done with the Iranians, which is said, "No progress on economics until there's progress on human rights and on weapons of mass destruction, the peace process on terrorism." Let's ask the Europeans, "Okay, what can we do to work with you to see that you take that same approach regarding Syria?"

SEN. LUGAR: Let me intrude at this point, because we would enjoy continuing the dialogue for a long time, but a roll-call vote is underway. There are seven minutes left to go. And Senator Biden and I will need to do our duty in another forum. But we thank you very much for coming to this hearing.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you all very, very much.

SEN. LUGAR: It's been very, very helpful for our understanding, we hope for those who have joined us in the hearing room, and for the American people who watch this on C-SPAN. Thank you very much.

SEN. BIDEN: Thanks an awful lot, gentlemen.

END.

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