TOPIC: SYRIA -- IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: The subcommittee will almost come to order. Now the subcommittee will come to order. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank and welcome Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, a great American, for making himself available this morning to appear before our subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia, in both an open, and then right afterward a classified session.

Recently the subcommittee held an oversight hearing to assess the impact of foreign investment in Iran's energy infrastructure has had on the Iranian regime's ability to finance its nuclear program, it's development of long-range ballistic missiles, and its continuing sponsoring of terrorist organizations. Unfortunately, we see a similar pattern emerging with respect to Syria.

Foreign investors have readily answered Damascus's call for assistance, pumping billions of dollars into the regime's coffers, through investments in the oil and gas sector. This in turn enabling Syria to expand its budgetary resources on its chemical and biological weapons projects, as well as its support for terrorist groups.

Even more disturbing is how Western Europe companies have directly contributed to Syria's weapons program. In 1989, former CIA Director William Webster told a congressional panel that the CIA had determined foreign assistance was, quote, "of critical importance in allowing Syria to develop its chemical warfare capability. Western European firms were instrumental in supplying the required chemicals and equipment. Without the provision of these key elements, Damascus would not have been able to produce chemical weapons," end quote.

Since then, Syria has increased and indeed diversified its weapons of mass destruction programs to present a serious threat to our allies and our interests in the region. And unclassified CIA report to Congress, covering the period from January to June 2001, stated that, quote, "Syria sought chemical weapons, chemical weapons related precursors, and expertise from foreign sources; maintains a stockpile of nerve agent sarin, and appears to be trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents," end quote.

Syria has reportedly manufactured varieties of aerial bombs containing chemical agents, such as sarin gas. According to Russian intelligence, Syria has stockpiles of thousands of chemical aerial bombs that are carried by various types of planes. Syria also has several thousand tactical munitions, including rockets and artillery shells containing sarin gas.

Syria reportedly has three production facilities for chemical weapons. But more disturbing are reports that Syria is massing chemical warheads for Scud missiles.

In January of 2002, the CIA estimated that, quote, "Syria has developed chemical weapon warheads for its Scuds," end quote; and that the intelligence community remains concerned about Syria's intentions regarding nuclear weapons.

Syria reportedly produces 30 Scud C missiles per year at an underground facility, and many Western analysts agree that these Syrian Scud Cs, originally purchased from North Korea, are being armed for long-range chemical weapons delivery. Syrian sources have publicly confirmed the test firing of Scud B and Scud C missiles with weaponized chemical agents.

Further, recent public reports indicate that Syria has purchased and already possesses ballistic cruise missiles that can carry warheads with clusters of chemical and biological agents.

In addition to mobile brigades, Syria has reportedly constructed hardened silos and a network of tunnels to hide these longer-range missiles.

With respect to Syria's biological weapons program, the Center for Scientific Studies and Research in Damascus has been reported to be the primary site for both Syria's biological and chemical programs, not to mention the procurement of dual-use chemical and biological technology and equipment from various European and South Asian countries.

The Center's published studies point to work with germs and proteins and report that the Center scientists have trained in France in the fields of toxicology and virology. Various sources have reported that Syria possesses and can weaponize anthrax and cholera. It has also been reported that smallpox virus was delivered to Syria from Russia for bioweapons development, and that the Syrian regime is investigating the use of another pathogen related to the bubonic plague.

Scholarly and media sources state that the production facilities for chemical weapons in the Aleppo area and other sites also include biological weapons facilities. While some assessments do not place Syria's biological weapons program beyond the research and development stage, the intentions of the Syrian regime with respect to its work with biological agents was made abundantly clear in April 2000 in a lengthy article published by the Syrian defense minister. In this article, entitled "Biological Germ Warfare: A New and Effective Method in Modern Warfare," the Syrian defense minister spoke about the military's plan to integrate biological weapons in its tactical and strategic arsenals.

However, the current and potential threats posed by the regime in Damascus do not end with chemical and biological weapons. Both Syria's current research reactor provided by China, and one light- water reactor that Russia has reportedly agreed to provide Syria, are under the supervision and scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, there are reports that Damascus has attempted to obtain assistance on further developing its nuclear infrastructure from Argentina and China. There are persistent rumors of a covert nuclear weapons program along with reports of planes returning from Syria to Iraq in 2002 with foam-producing systems, which could be used for uranium enrichment.

These, combined with Syria's recent agreement with Russia concerning close cooperation on nuclear power, raise grave questions regarding the Syria regime's true objectives on the nuclear front. The same linkage that former CIA Director Webster warned us about in 1989 regarding the role of foreign assistance in developing Syria's chemical weapons applies to Syria's nuclear intentions today. Thus it is imperative to keep in mind President Bush's statement in his January 29th, 2002 State of the Union address. The president declared that the United States would work, quote, "to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction," end quote.

In themselves, Syria's nefarious activities pose grave concerns for the U.S. and our allies. However, the magnitude of the threat increases dramatically when placed in the context of Syria's continued support for global terrorism and its relationship with other pariah states.

Public, U.S. and foreign sources assess that there has been a qualitative increase in Syria's role in arms supply to terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. There are reports that Syria has recently begun supplying extended-range rockets from its own production to Hezbollah. We have also received information from public sources indicating that Syria is using Lebanon to hide weapons of mass destruction, and to serve as a transshipment point for weapons to terrorist groups, given that the coalition victory in Iraq closed many of their usual transport routes.

There's also increased cooperation between Syria and other rogue regimes, such as Iran. Throughout the 1990s, delivery of missiles and related cargo was done in coordination with the Iranian regime. On May 29th, 2003, Syria's deputy prime minister and foreign minister described the bilateral relations between Syria and Iran as being in the best shape ever. He noted that coordination between Syria and Iran is based on long experience and joint interests. Unfortunately, just as ties between Iran and Syria appear to be strengthening, the government's focus on appeasing these two terrorists regimes are also expanding their ties with Iran and Syria.

As I noted in the beginning of my statement, the scope and the nature of foreign investment in Syria almost directly mirrors the pattern established with Iran. Perhaps even more disturbing, however, are the investments of U.S. companies in Syria. I am deeply concerned that American companies continue to sign multi-billion-dollar deals to invest in Syria's oil and gas sector. Worse yet, they are reportedly joining hundreds of other types of U.S. companies doing business in Syria. We must work to deny Syria all resources and ability to expand its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The U.S. must use every tool at our disposal to confront this threat.

I believe that the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, which has accumulated over 250 co-sponsors, is such a response. This act represents a long overdue effort to hold Syria accountable for its sponsorship of terrorism, its development of weapons of mass destruction, and its ongoing occupation of Lebanon, by toughening economic and other sanctions against Syria.

On May 11th, 2002, Secretary of State Powell warned a Syrian leader that, quote, "He will find that he is on the wrong side of history," end quote, if he does not, among other priorities, move against terrorism and discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It appears to me that over the two decades, and particularly since the September 11th attacks, Syria's overall actions have not been those of a state that shares our commitment to non- proliferation and combating terrorism. It should be the end of the line for the Syrian regime.

And now I am pleased to yield to the ranking member of our subcommittee, my good friend Mr. Ackerman of New York.

REP. GARY ACKERMAN (D-NY): Thank you, local Madam Chairwoman, for your leadership in this Congress in the area of international relations, and for calling this very important hearing to examine the state of our bilateral relations with Syria.

This has been a momentous year for our relations with Damascus, and I believe we have come to a point where there can be no substitute for action. I too want to welcome the secretary.

Unfortunately, the Bush administration policy regarding Syria is best characterized as a pattern of risk and drift. We awakened suddenly to a wide range of hostile Syrian policies. We threaten serious consequences. We conduct a round or two of intense diplomacy. And then we allow our attention to wander off. This pattern describes perfectly the brief period of intense engagement with Syria followed by the end of major combat in Iraq. By now it seems clear that the energy and insistence demonstrated during Secretary Powell's May visit to Damascus has dissipated to no effect whatsoever.

During combat operations in Iraq, there was credible evidence of arms and people moving from Syria into Iraq. Today there is no question that Syria is directly responsible for providing safe passage and transit documentation to many of the terrorists now seeking to undermine our relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Syrian cooperation in battling al Qaeda has also waned dramatically. According to Ambassador J. Coffer Black, the State Department counterterrorism coordinator, and I quote him, "We clearly don't have the full support of the Syrian government on the al Qaeda problem. They have allowed al Qaeda personnel to come in and virtually settle in Syria with their knowledge and support," end of quote.

Moreover, as it has for decades, Damascus is continuing its active opposition to U.S. efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict through its ongoing aid and support for Hezbollah. Hezbollah of course is continually seeking to increase its presence in the West Bank and Gaza, in order to facilitate its support, have a greater level of Palestinian terrorism against Israel.

Damascus is also recently reported to have again supplemented Hezbollah's arsenal with weapons from Syria's own depots, filling in for the Iranian weapons that can no longer transit through Iraqi air space. And there is no question that the recent escalation of tensions on Israel's northern border could not have taken place without Syria's approval.

On July 22nd, President Bush said, and I quote the president, "Syria continues to harbor and assist terrorists. This behavior is completely unacceptable, and states that support terror will be held accountable" -- so said the president. To date, we have done nothing to hold them accountable, and subsequently there has been no positive change in Syria's behavior. Nor has there been any indication at all that Damascus is prepared to change its offensive policies.

I fail to understand why there has been no action on the part of the Bush administration. The Ba'athist regime in Damascus has made it indisputably clear that they will not be an ally in the war on terrorism, and that they are in fact deeply committed to sponsoring, supporting, facilitating and underwriting international terrorism directed at the United States, at Israel and at Iraq. Syria continues to illegally occupy Lebanon, and is an active threat to peace in the Middle East and to vital U.S. security interests. Damascus has been given every opportunity for rapprochement and it is now clear these chances were wasted on the Assad dictatorship.

There is nothing left to say to a regime that repeatedly chooses to support terror. As President Bush told Congress and the American people only days after September 11th -- and again I quote the president: "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists," said the president. Syria is with the terrorists. They have made that perfectly clear.

Now it is time for the Bush administration to match its bold words with action. By coincidence, both the United States and Syria are in between ambassadorial appointments. Both countries are currently represented by a charge d'affaires. Today I call upon the Bush administration to maintain the status quo and to downgrade our diplomatic relations with Syria until Damascus (breaks its ties with terrorism ?) and demonstrates its readiness to behave as a civilized nation. Unless Syria changes its policies, no United States ambassador should be sent to Damascus, and the president should refuse to accept the credentials of any proposed Syrian ambassador to the United States.

Secretary Bolton, I have a letter to the president and to the secretary of State reiterating the points that I have just made, and I would ask you to carry these to the president and to the secretary.

Again, I want to thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen for calling this very important hearing, and I look forward to hearing from you today, Undersecretary Bolton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. I would like to now recognize Mr. Pitts for an opening statement.

REP. JOSEPH PITTS (R-PA): Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. First of all, thank you for convening this hearing today to assess and examine Syria's weapons of mass destruction programs and state-sponsored terrorism. This is very important.

Over the last 30 years, Syria has developed chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, reportedly even has conducted research and development of biological weapons. Syria has one of the largest ballistic missile inventories in the Middle East, comprised of several hundred short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

In a speech to the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, our distinguished witness today grouped Syria with Libya and Cuba as rogue states that support international terrorism and are pursuing the development of mass destruction weapons.

U.S. officials are rightly concerned that Syrian acquisition of additional weapons, including improved missiles, will cause further regional tensions and increase the potential threats to Israel, and undermine arms control efforts.

Additionally, since 1979, Syria has appeared regularly on a list of countries which the State Department identifies as supportive of international terrorism. According to the State Department's most recent annual report on global terrorism, Syria has continued to provide support and safe haven for Palestinian groups that have committed terrorist acts. The report states that Syria has continued to facilitate resupply of the militant Lebanese Shi'ite organization Hezbollah. While Syria claims that such operations constitute legitimate resistance activity, as distinguished from terrorism, many people fail to see a distinction.

On May 3rd, 2003, Secretary Powell visited Damascus to discuss a range of issues with Syrian leaders, including President Bashar al- Assad. And since this meeting, Secretary Powell has expressed dissatisfaction with Syria's failure to take meaningful steps against terrorism. At a press conference on June 20th, he said, quote, "Syrians took limited steps. Those limited steps are totally inadequate." End quote. And he went on to say that the United States will continue to press Syria on the issue of terrorism and make clear to them that until they move in a more positive direction, they will not be -- there will not be a better relationship with the United States, and ultimately it will affect their interests. He said that Syria can either be a contributing member to this process -- that is the peace process in the Middle East -- or continue to be a terrorist- supporting regime that does not want to be a part of this process, in which case there will be consequences.

As the United States is closely working with the Israelis and the Palestinians to implement a road map to peace, bring about the peaceful coexistence of two states, we cannot afford to have a sovereign state with weapons of mass destruction inclined towards terrorism perched on the doorstep there. And if Syria does not take more concrete and verifiable steps to end its support of terrorism, abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, then I'm sure that there will be consequences.

I look forward to the testimony of Undersecretary Bolton, a discussion of how sanctions can be used as a tool to force the Syrian government to make those changes. And Madam Chair, I welcome the opportunity today to hear this important testimony. I yield back my time.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Pitts. And now I'm so proud to recognize my colleague from New York, Mr. Engel, with whom I'm so proud to be a co-sponsor of the Syrian Accountability Act, to talk about one of those tools that we can use. Mr. Engel.

REP. ELIOT ENGEL (D-NY): Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I wanted to thank you for holding this hearing, and I especially want to thank you for all of your hard work as the lead Republican sponsor of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

As we know, and our colleagues know, our bipartisan bill currently has 262 cosponsors in the House, and 71 sponsors in the Senate. It has the majorities of both parties in both bodies, and majorities in the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So, it truly is a bipartisan bill. It's truly a consensus bill. And I believe very strongly that the best thing that this Congress can do in order to tell Syria that her conduct is unacceptable is pass the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, have the president sign it, and give the administration another tool that it can use to fight the war on terror, and give the administration a tool that it can use to tell Syria that their behavior is not acceptable. And President Bush did say "You're either with us, or with the terrorists."

I'm delighted that Undersecretary John Bolton is here. I want to personally thank him. I've been an admirer of his work for many, many years, and I want to, for the record, say that his strong leadership and language in dealing with Syria in the past is very, very important. And I want to, Secretary Bolton, recall your excellent past efforts at removing the "Zionism is racism" language at the United Nations. I think that that should be stated. You have long been a stalwart, a fighter for peace and justice in the Middle East and elsewhere, and I look forward to hearing your testimony today.

Over the weekend, an article in Sunday's Times of London reported that there were guerrilla camps in Lebanon training terrorists entering Iraq to kill American forces. I would like unanimous consent, Madam Chairwoman, to --

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Without objection.

REP. ENGEL: -- enter this in the record, the article in the London Times. And it's my understanding, Secretary Bolton, that in your testimony today you will confirm that Syria is permitting the entry of terrorists into Iraq from Syria. I have often said, and I say it again, that Syria's record on terrorism, in my estimation, is worse than even Iraq's. And Syria's strong and active opposition to our efforts in Iraq and their support of terrorism should be enough, I believe, to pass the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

Syria is also, as we said, a major state sponsor of terror. Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other organizations are headquartered in Damascus and also get active support from the government in Damascus.

And let's also mention again that Syria occupies a sovereign state -- Lebanon. They are not a stabilizing force in Lebanon. Syrian troops may have initially gone into Lebanon ostensibly to be a stabilizing force, but right now, they are an occupation force.

And I want to say for the record, in terms of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, we hear very, very often that the Palestinian people are entitled to a state. I want to state here loudly and clearly that the Lebanese people are entitled to a state -- not a state that's a puppet state, not a state that's occupied and essentially run by Syria, but a free Lebanese state run by the Lebanese people. The Lebanese people are a charter member of the United Nations, and Lebanon deserves its independence and its state, and it deserves to be freed from Syrian oppression and occupation.

Let's also say, and let's also take note of the fact that Syria has massive stocks of chemical weapons and ballistic weapons to deliver them. They have weapons like sarin gas. They're developing a offensive biological weapons capability, and hundreds of Scud missiles to deliver them. That is unacceptable. Massive stocks of chemical weapons and ballistic weapons to deliver biological weapons is unacceptable.

Today, we're focusing on Syrian weapons of mass destruction. President Bush has rightly characterized the greatest threats emanating from terror-supporting regimes like Syria, which possesses weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Secretary, much of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act is based in its findings on public, CIA and State Department reports about Syrian support for terror, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles program. I want to also state again that back in 1979, the U.S. State Department put forward a list of countries which support terror. Syria is a charter member of that list. Syria has been on that list for 24 years, since the inception of the list in 1979 to the present day. And yet Syria is the only nation currently on that list with which we have normal and full diplomatic relations. I don't understand it. I don't think it makes sense. And I think it's time to stop this charade.

During the war in Iraq, we know that weaponry passed through Syria into Iraq to challenge and kill U.S. forces. We know that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, had weapons of mass destruction -- we're trying to find them. It would not surprise me if those weapons of mass destruction that we cannot find in Iraq wound up, and are today in Syria.

Secretary Powell in May went to Damascus, talked about the Syria Accountability Act, talked about using it, saying that Congress may force his hand. Came back, spoke on "Meet the Press" and many other programs, talked about the Syria Accountability Act. It makes sense to me to have the administration use this tool as a carrot and stick approach with Syria. And there was a lot of tough talk about Syria during the war. And Secretary Rumsfeld came to the Congress and briefed the Congress, and Secretary Powell after the war, but lately we haven't heard it. And I think what Syria is getting from us is inconsistency and realizing that we're going to mouth off and talk, but where there's no -- there, there, we're not putting -- we're not putting our force behind our rhetoric -- and I believe a way we can do that again is to pass the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

It's long stated that Syria has been against U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East, and has really been on the opposite side of virtually everything we've tried to do to bring stability to that region.

So, Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your comments today to fill the gaps in the public reports of the CIA and State Department reports, and to bring the subcommittee up to date since these reports were released. And I look forward to working with the administration to pass the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

And I yield back my time. And I thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Engel. It's a pleasure working with you on that bill.

REP. ENGEL: Thank you. Same here.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: I'd like to recognize Mr. Chabot of Ohio.

REP. STEVE CHABOT (R-OH): Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will waive an opening statement so that we can get to the testimony more quickly. Thank you.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much. That's the reason I recognized you. But thank you for all of our members for being here today. I'd like to take this -- oh, Mr. Smith -- I'm sorry, Nick, I had not looked over there. I apologize.

REP. NICK SMITH (R-MI): Steve, thanks for yielding your time to me. (Laughter.)

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Mr. Smith.

REP. SMITH: Madam Chairman, Syria's open state sponsorship of terrorism and, if you will, destabilizing impact on the Mideast peace process and regime, I think, are quite clear. Since 1979, Syria has been included in the State Department's list of countries that support terrorism.

I think if we're going to be serious in winning this war on terrorism, it means the United States has got to be even more aggressive in challenging these countries with the economic benefits of sending their products to the United States.

I think Syria certainly, like countries such as Libya, need special attention and, if you will, a situation where the United States gets very tough in insisting that they not be detrimental in terms of us winning the war on terrorism.

Since the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bashar al-Assad has been visited by Secretary Powell but, according to reports I read, has failed to heed advice on severing ties with terrorism and helping the U.S. find key Saddam Hussein officials.

And in conclusion, Madam Chairman, I just think the United States and the United Nations needs to be very tough on countries like Syria. And I yield back.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Smith. I apologize for not seeing you earlier. I was busy trying to practice how to say the word "precursor" in my opening statement.

I'd like to take this opportunity to introduce our witness this morning. Undersecretary John Bolton was sworn in as undersecretary of State for Arms Control & International Security on May 11, 2001. Prior to his appointment, Secretary Bolton was senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute.

Previously, Secretary Bolton served as assistant secretary for international organization affairs at the Department of State from 1989 to '93, assistant attorney general at the Department of Justice from '85 to '89, assistant administrator for program and policy coordination at the U.S. Agency for International Development from '82 to '83, and general counsel for the U.S. Agency for International Development from '81 to '82.

We thank you so much for being here today, Mr. Bolton.

MR. BOLTON: Thank you very much to the chair and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear before you today. Since we have two sessions, one unclassified and open and one classified and closed, as you know, I have two separate statements, the unclassified statement and a written text that's classified, about twice as long.

With your permission, what I'd like to do here is just give an abridged version of the unclassified testimony, and then I'd be pleased to answer questions that may be possible before we go into closed session.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Correct. Without objection. Thank you.

MR. BOLTON: Thank you. Syria remains a security concern of the United States on two important counts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. I will focus on the latter, although the potential linkages are obvious.

Specifically, our coalition's operations in Iraq show that this administration and the international community take the link between terrorism and WMD most seriously. There's no graver threat to our country today than states that both sponsor terrorism and possess or aspire to possess weapons of mass destruction.

Syria, which offers physical sanctuary and political protection to groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and whose terrorist operations have killed hundreds of innocent people, including Americans, falls into this category of states of potential dual threat.

While there is currently no information indicating that the Syrian government has transferred WMD to terrorist organizations or would permit such groups to acquire them, Syria's ties to numerous terrorist groups underlie the reasons for our continued anxiety.

Without question, among rogue states, those most aggressively seeking to acquire or develop WMD and their means of delivery, and which are therefore threats to our national security, are Iran and North Korea, followed by Libya and Syria. It is also the case that these states are among those we identify as state sponsors of terrorism.

We aim not just to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, but also to roll back and ultimately eliminate such weapons from the arsenals of rogue states and ensure that the terrorist states they sponsor do not acquire weapons of mass destruction.

As President Bush has said repeatedly, we will stress peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the proliferation threat. However, in order to roll back proliferation and protect innocent American citizens, as well as our friends and allies, we must allow ourselves the option to use every tool in our non-proliferation tool box.

Non-proliferation standards are all too often ignored and flagrantly violated by governments that view weapons of mass destruction as a means of enhancing their security and international influence. Many of these governments are resistant to conventional diplomatic dialogue.

While we pursue the diplomatic track whenever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as economic sanctions, as well as interdiction and seizure or other means. The pursuit of WMD and ballistic missile delivery systems, especially by state sponsors of terrorism, must be neither cost-free nor successful.

Proliferators, and especially states still deliberating whether to seek WMD, must understand that they will pay a steep price for their efforts. In short, if the language of persuasion fails, these states must see and feel the logic of adverse consequences. Moreover, adverse consequences must not only fall on the states aspiring to possess such weapons, but also on the states supplying them.

In situations where we cannot convince a state to stop proliferant behavior, we must also have the option of interdicting shipments to ensure that technology does not fall into the wrong hands. These interdiction efforts are key to a comprehensive non- proliferation strategy. Interdiction involves identifying an imminent shipment or transfer and working to impede the shipment.

As the president noted in his national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction, we must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.

On May 31st, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative, a global multilateral arrangement to seize sensitive cargoes that may be in transit to or from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

Since then we have worked with 10 other countries to develop the set of principles that identify practical steps necessary to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials at sea, in the air or on land. The 11 countries met in Madrid in June and in Brisbane in July. And on September 4th in Paris, we reached agreement and announced a statement of interdiction principles.

This represents the shared political commitment of these countries to strengthen efforts to combat the proliferation threat. The United States welcomes support for the PSI principles from all states that share our concerns about proliferation and our resolve to take new and active measures to defeat this threat.

Proliferators are using increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to defeat export controls and obtain technologies for their WMD or missile programs. We need to enhance our ability to prevent them from making these acquisitions.

There exists a widespread consensus that this menace, together with terrorism, constitutes the greatest challenge to international security generally and to our national security in particular.

Before I address the specifics of Syria's WMD programs, let me first discuss press reports that Iraq covertly transferred weapons of mass destruction to Syria in an attempt to hide them from U.N. inspectors and coalition forces.

We have seen these reports, reviewed them carefully, and see them as cause for concern. Thus far we have been unable to confirm that such transfers occurred. We are continuing with the full breadth of resources at our command to seek conclusive evidence that any such transfer has taken place. We have raised with the Syrians on numerous occasions, even before military action against Iraq, the seriousness with which we would view any transfer of Iraqi dual-use or military- related items into Syria.

We have seen Syria take a series of hostile actions toward coalition forces in Iraq. Syria allowed military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack and kill our service members during the war, and is still doing so. Syria continues to provide safe haven and political cover to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has killed hundreds of Americans in the past.

Statements from many of Syria's public officials during this time vilified the coalition's motives in seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Indeed, the United States portrayed as an enemy is a consistent theme found in newspapers and public statements in Syria, as it is in other states in the region.

Although Damascus has increased its cooperation regarding Iraq since the fall of the Iraqi regime, its behavior during Operation Iraqi Freedom underscores the importance of taking seriously reports and information on Syria's WMD capabilities.

Now, on those capabilities, on the nuclear side we are concerned about Syria's nuclear R&D program and continue to watch for any sign of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use technologies that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program.

In addition, Russia and Syria have approved the draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. The Syrians have a Chinese-supplied miniature research reactor under IAEA safeguards at Der Al-Hadjar.

Syria is a party to the non-proliferation treaty and has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but, like Iran, has not yet signed or to our knowledge even begun negotiations on the IAEA additional protocol.

The additional protocol is an important tool that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the IAEA's investigative powers to verify compliance with NPT safeguards obligations and provide the IAEA with the ability to act quickly on any indicators of undeclared nuclear materials, facilities and activities. We believe the additional protocols should be a new minimal standard for countries to demonstrate their non-proliferation bona fides.

Since the 1970s, Syria has pursued what is now one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons capabilities. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles and is engaged in the research and development of the more toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX.

Syria is fully committed to expanding and improving its CW program, which it believes serves as a deterrent to regional adversaries. Syria continues active chemical munitions testing, although it has not used chemical agents in any conflicts.

Although Syria is more self-sufficient than most other Third World CW-capable states, foreign assistance has been a key element in the establishment and operation of Syria's chemical weapons program. In particular, Syria remains heavily dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment.

As a result, Syria will need to continue foreign procurement activities, something the PSI is designed to counter, in order to continue its CW program. Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability. Syria has signed but not ratified the Biological Weapons Convention. These poor man's nuclear weapons do not require large production capability and, depending on the agent and dissemination method, can be extremely lethal.

I also discuss in the statement, Madam Chairman, the Syrian ballistic missile capabilities, which relies heavily on North Korean and Iranian entities' participation in the program, and also on Syria's advanced conventional weapons capability, which depends on a number of critically important Russian-supplied systems.

Of course, I will have much more to say on all of these subjects during the closed hearing, and I look forward to a more specific and detailed discussion than we can have in an open hearing. As we all recognize, the importance of protecting and preserving vital intelligence sources and methods necessarily and properly restricts what we can say publicly.

Nonetheless, the conduct of national security requires that we take all available information into account, which I believe we will be able to do in a classified session.

When the world witnessed the destructive potential of terrorism on September the 11th, we were reminded of the need to remain steadfast in recognizing emerging threats to our security. In Syria, we see expanding WMD capabilities and continued state sponsorship of terrorism.

As the president said, we cannot allow the world's most dangerous weapons to fall into the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes and will work tirelessly to ensure that this is not the case for Syria.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Secretary Bolton, again for appearing before our subcommittee.

Given Syria's WMD capabilities and potential threat to U.S. interests in the region, do you believe that Syria's so-called cooperation with respect to certain terrorist groups is sufficient to shield them from punitive action by the U.S.?

MR. BOLTON: Well, as you know, Secretary Powell has been engaged in some very intensive diplomacy with the government of Syria, and several members of the subcommittee have mentioned that.

He said, just as recently as yesterday, that "the Syrian leadership has not responded as forcefully and as thoroughly as I would have liked," and he refers to the fact that you're holding this hearing today on the Syria Accountability and Restoration of Lebanese Sovereignty Act.

I think it's fair to say that the secretary has very eloquently and forcefully explained to the government of Syria what our view is on this range of concerns from sponsorship of terrorism to cooperation with the former Iraqi regime, and the concern that I have expressed about the transfer of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. And he has engaged even as we speak in some very delicate balancing of a variety of factors -- diplomatic and political. So I think it's important that all of us who are concerned about stability in the region, the outcome of the Middle East peace process, the successful reconstitution of a representative Iraqi government support the secretary at this delicate time in his efforts, and give him the discretion that he needs to act to what we hope will be to bring this to a successful diplomatic conclusion.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. Syria relies heavily on foreign sources for its chemical and biological weapons program. Of the foreign entities subject to proliferation sanctions, which if any have been sanctioned for contributing to or assisting WMD program? And have any Pakistani, North Korean, Chinese or Russian entities been sanctioned for their assistance to the Syrian regime? And, further, what steps are being undertaken to prevent such transfers of technology and material or assistance from being fulfilled?

MR. BOLTON: Well, a number of entities from the countries you mention have been subject to sanction, and we are in a continuing process of reviewing transfers to Syria of components, production equipment, precursors for weapons of mass destruction. And indeed under the applicable statutes for certain kinds of conventional lethal military equipment. This is something that we have been pressing both our European allies and countries like Russia and China generally on the export of materials to rogue states, and to try to strengthen the national and multilateral export control regimes that almost all these countries have, at least on a declaratory basis.

But I think we've also acknowledged that the multilateral export control regimes and the treaty regimes themselves are not sufficient, because we can still see international commerce in these commodities. And as I think the prepared testimony lays out, Syria is a perfect example of a country that basically does not have the capacity to produce many of these elements necessary for a weapons of mass destruction program domestically. It has to rely on purchases from broad and other kinds of assistance. And that's one reason why we have developed under the president's leadership the proliferation security initiative, that where the export control regimes break down, consistent with our other national and international authority, we want the ability to cut those shipments off. If you deny Syria and other would-be proliferants the components they need to construct weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, you can prevent them, or at least materially delay their achieving that status. And that is a very, very high priority for us.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. As an NPT signatory, does Syria have the full scope IAEA safeguards implemented on its nuclear research center? And is Syria in compliance with its obligations under the NPT? And how would you interpret the statement by Syria's foreign minister in April of this year that Syria won't allow any inspections on its soil? Do you believe this to be an indication of its nuclear intentions?

MR. BOLTON: Well, Syria does have a safeguards agreement. Whether it's in compliance -- we don't have any evidence at the moment whether it's in noncompliance. But this really underlines the importance of the full implementation of the additional protocol that I referred to, because as it is now I think one of the lessons that we all learned in the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War was that the IAEA's safeguards program, commendable as it was, was not strong enough to detect a determined effort to circumvent the agreement and produce nuclear weapons, or have a nuclear weapons program done in a clandestine fashion. And Syria's unwillingness to adopt and implement the additional protocol is extremely troubling, as in the case of Iran, which is also refusing so far to sign and implement that protocol.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much for testifying, Mr. Bolton.

Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Secretary, your testimony, written testimony, the unabridged, unclassified version, states that we must allow ourselves the option to use every tool in our non-proliferation toolbox. I am wondering exactly what you mean by that. You site Syria among the world's greatest threats to America's national security. Are we talking about regime change in Syria if they do not voluntarily rid themselves of whatever it is we are saying they have or do that threatens our national security?

MR. BOLTON: Mr. Ackerman, as the president has made clear, and as we are directed, our preference is to solve these problems by peaceful and diplomatic means. But the president has also been very clear that we are not taking any potions off the table. As I mentioned a moment ago, Secretary Powell is conducting very intensive efforts on this front. It's a delicate moment. He has spoken to the subject yesterday, and I am sure you will understand I really don't have anything to add to what he has to say on the subject. But the level of attention that he and the president are directing to this problem is quite high. They understand the significance and the risk posed by the weapons of mass destruction and the role that Syria can play, positively or negatively, in the region, and I think that's why I urge and hope that the committee will continue to support the secretary in these very critical times.

REP. ACKERMAN: I think there's no question but that this committee and the Congress supports the pursuit of every peaceful means of resolving any kind of conflict, especially one as serious as the one that exists in our bilateral relations with Syria. But the question remains with the background of Iraq, what do we do when? In your oral testimony, the abridged version before the committee, you stated that -- let me back up. In the full text you state with great detail -- at least 25 percent of your testimony is about, you know, you need no additional tools from the Congress to deal with Syria. This specifically in response to the Congress's attempt, at least by many in the Congress, to put an additional arrow in your quiver, and explain at least with the citing of executive order number, section four of executive order 12,938, as amended in 1998. You cite that quite extensively as to what we can do with states such as Syria. And then you list all of the penalties that can be imposed upon Syria. It is unclear to me if those penalties under executive order cited indeed has been brought to bear, and if any of those sanctions in that specific executive order that you cite -- and you list all of those things in your testimony -- have actually been imposed on Syria.

MR. BOLTON: Well, the executive order sections of the testimony are intended to show that even without the provisions of the Syria Accountability Act we do have authorities at least with respect to WMD issues to impose sanctions. When the administration took office we found that executive order had essentially lain fallow, and we have applied it vigorously -- not specifically in the context of Syria, because other legislative enactments have been used. But one --

REP. ACKERMAN: Not in the case of Syria?

MR. BOLTON: Not to my knowledge at this point. I can check on that --

REP. ACKERMAN: Syria poses among the greatest of threats, and you hear for the first time, and I understand from the story that's in the New York Times today that somebody leaked, giving all of your testimony basically and the summary of it. There seems to be somewhat of a squabble going on within the administration. But it does cite that your testimony has been cleared and vetted by everybody at this point, including the intelligence community and the White House. That being said, you say in your testimony that has been -- if the New York Times articles that was leaked is accurate, and the president and the White House have indeed signed off -- you have now for the first time, this administration, linked Syria with those countries in the axis of evil, absent of course Iraq which we presume no longer poses an immediate threat to the security of the United States. Having so linked Syria at this point in that group, and in your testimony having in great detail listed the disastrous, devastating, horrible, horrendous things that Syria has done, including being responsible for the taking of U.S. lives, why do we continue at this point to have rhetoric rather than see any kind of action whatsoever? I think the response to the rhetoric has been made clear by the foreign minister of Syria who said that we have the stupidest administration in history. That is their response. Do you expect them to revisit their viewpoint?

MR. BOLTON: Well, that was certainly not an endearing comment. But I can tell you that Secretary Powell is very cognizant of all the considerations that you mention. And, as I say, in his judgment now the policy that he's pursuing is one that is still designed, and hopefully will result in the outcome we want from Syria. But it is also something --

REP. ACKERMAN: Have any of the discussions over the years with Syria to date resulted in any change in the perspective of Syria in their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and all of the things you charge in your testimony?

MR. BOLTON: None that I am aware of, but that is --

REP. ACKERMAN: So why would we expect additional dialogue to do something if we don't take the minimalist of actions?

MR. BOLTON: Because -- because the circumstances in the Middle East have changed dramatically with the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. And that was the purpose of the secretary's mission to Damascus, to tell the Syrian regime in unmistakable terms, which he did, what their choices were. And the question I think you are asking, Mr. Ackerman, goes to the issue of when in the secretary's judgment, the administration's judgment, he has done all that he can and that there is no further response forthcoming. It is not in his view the moment we are at yet. And that's why I think it's important to allow him to play this out until we get --

REP. ACKERMAN: My time is run, but if I might just -- is there anything that the secretary heard -- and if you can't tell us here, we have another session -- anything he heard in his discussions with the Syrians that would indicate that we should be hopeful that there might be a change?

MR. BOLTON: Well, I think we are still waiting for more, and I would like to discuss the specifics in the closed session.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, yes. I'd like to ask the members to please stick to the clock for questions, and suggest to our members that those questions that we cannot get to in the open hearing that they be posed in the classified portion, because the undersecretary must leave for Moscow immediately following his congressional appearance.

Mr. Smith. Oh, Mr. Pitts. Thank you.

REP. PITTS: Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, could you confirm or deny public reports citing that Syria has hired Russian experts to help cultivate biological material to be used for installation on its warheads?

MR. BOLTON: I am not aware of information on that. I'd be happy to discuss the BW program and Syria's external efforts to gain external assistance for it in a closed session, congressman.

REP. PITTS: Okay. Do you -- can you comment about what extent Syria might have used the pharmaceutical industry as a cover for purchases relating to its CW program?

MR. BOLTON: I'm sorry, that's just another one I think I'd prefer to answer in the closed session.

REP. PITTS: Okay, all right. What about the impact of the Syrian-North Korean agreement on scientific and technical cooperation which could entail collaboration on ballistic missile technology and nonconventional arms? Do you believe that Syria is making a concerted effort to reach out to nations that the president has said are in this axis of evil?

MR. BOLTON: Well, the subject of North Korea's ballistic missile cooperation with states like Iran, Syria and others, is of the gravest concern for us, because the North Koreans have had and continue to have a very active program to expand their ballistic missile capability, extend the range and accuracy of their missiles. And their work with other countries may provide them with the -- the countries involved with mutually-reinforcing assistance; for example, the North Koreans currently have a moratorium on launched testing of ballistic missiles from the Korean Peninsula. But if other countries with which they are engaged in technical cooperation are themselves conducting ballistic missile test launches, or are sharing telemetry and other information, that's obviously something that could benefit the North Koreans, despite the moratorium. So these linkages between Syria, North Korea, Iran, are linkages that concern us very considerably -- no question about it.

REP. PITTS: And is there cooperation between Syria and Iran on the chemical front?

MR. BOLTON: That's another one I think I'd have to ask to answer in the closed session.

REP. PITTS: All right. Has any evidence surfaced that shows Syria has transferred conventional weapons or any types of weapons to its terrorist proxies, such as Hezbollah?

MR. BOLTON: Congressman, as I said in the prepared statement, we don't have evidence of that. What we have though is a record on the part of the Syrian government of extensive support of many kinds for terrorist groups over the years, and the sorts of WMD capabilities that I've described. And whenever you have both of those pieces of evidence in the hands of the same government, it has to be an element of concern.

REP. PITTS: Given that you're the point person at the Department of State on Russian assistance to certain states, do you have any indication that the Russians would consider reducing or eliminating this aspect of the relationship with Syria?

MR. BOLTON: Well, we've had extensive discussions with the government of Russia during the administration about -- about that subject specifically and also about the broad subject of Russia becoming more closely integrated into Western security systems. And one of the things that President Bush has stressed to President Putin repeatedly, and I think will so again at Camp David in just a few days, is that part of drawing closer to Western security structures necessarily has to involve Russia accepting and implementing the same kinds of norms on nonproliferation that we and other Western countries have established. That's a very, very important element of the bilateral relationship with Russia and one that the president and all of us stress repeatedly.

REP. PITTS: You said that there had been some sanctioning of entities that were working with Syria on WMD programs. How many entities are currently under review for proliferation sanctions?

MR. BOLTON: Well, there are a number of entities, for example, Russian entities that are under sanctions for the supply of lethal military equipment, typically high-end conventional weapons. I'd be happy to supply you with a complete list of that.

I might say, Congressman, that the decision on imposing sanctions, whether under the executive order or under the several authorizing statutes that Congress has passed, can be a very arduous process with extensive inter-agency deliberations and competing concerns, sometimes operating on the basis of information that's less than complete. And it's something that really would be, I think, useful to review in a closed session. It's not a snap decision. We don't make decisions on sanctions in a -- in an offhand fashion. And in fact that, I think, one of the -- one of the issues about sanctions is there may be many cases where the evidence points in the direction of an improper arms transfer, but where for a variety of reasons different agencies decide that it's just not appropriate to -- actually to impose sanctions. So, it's a complex process, but one that I can assure you we have under continuing review, both as to the substance of the sanctions and as to how we can improve the decision- making process.

REP. PITTS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'll continue in closed session.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. Thank you. And to close our hearing, I'm going to recognize Mr. Engel for his five minutes of questioning, and then I'll ask the members to meet in the side room where we will be escorted for the classified briefing. Mr. Engel.

REP. ENGEL: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you discussed several penalties, sanctions, and tools which the president has to use against Syria and other proliferating states. You also said that the administration supports the use of these tools to hold accountable states, especially those supportive of terror. Our bill, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, merely expands the tools at the disposal of the president. Other than a ban on the sale of dual-use items, it contains sanctions not contained elsewhere in U.S. law or executive orders.

And I also want to say that a high administration official in the Middle East has said to me privately that our bill would be useful in changing Syrian behavior. Although you've given no position on the bill, wouldn't you agree that the provision of additional tools for managing Syrian proliferation, occupation of Lebanon and terrorism would be helpful to U.S. policy?

MR. BOLTON: Congressman, specifically on the bill, the administration has not taken a position, and we have it under continuing review. As I've indicated to you personally, I'm prepared to work with you and the other co-sponsors to see what might be possible. I won't rehearse because I know you know the traditional executive branch view on these matters as well as I do. It's something that -- it's one of the reasons that we have the executive order and the authorities that it provides.

But where we are as of this moment is we do not have a position on the bill, but I'm prepared to continue to carry on the discussions that we've started and see what might be possible.

REP. ENGEL: Well, I'd like to carry on those discussions because, as you know and we've discussed, there is tremendous support for the bill in Congress, bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate.

I agree with everything you said in your testimony. I want to just highlight some of the things you have in your written testimony, which you also mentioned today. You said, "Let me first discuss press reports that Iraq covertly transferred weapons of mass destruction to Syria in an attempt to hide them from the U.N. inspectors and coalition forces. We have seen these reports, reviewed them carefully, and see them as cause for concern." You also said, "We have seen Syria take a series of hostile acts towards coalition forces in Iraq. Syria allowed military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack and kill our servicemen -- our service members during the war." And then you added, "and is still doing so." I want to highlight that. "Syria continues to provide safe haven and political cover to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has killed hundreds of Americans in the past."

Those are excellent statements. They're true, and I agree with them. But the frustration we have is that here it is, 24 years after Lebanon (sic) was on the list of -- the State Department's own list of countries that support terrorism, and we're still playing the same old game with Lebanon (sic) -- you know, we -- we -- with Syria, I'm sorry. We talk tough, but then when -- when the moment of truth comes, we back off. And then we talk tough again, and when the moment of truth comes, we back off. And so Syria thinks that it never really needs to respond because it's the same old game we've been playing for 25 years. We never -- there's never any kind of consequences to their actions. So, I think you can understand the frustration that we feel.

MR. BOLTON: No, I understand, and I don't purport to be here representing 24 years of American policy. But what I can say is that Secretary Powell, who has been deeply involved on the precise points that you're raising, and has made, back in May and subsequently, made it very clear how strongly we feel about all of these issues, is working this problem aggressively. I think it's interesting that when he was interviewed yesterday in Kuwait, he again made mention of the fact that the committee would be considering your bill. I think that's a clear signal to the Syrians that there's a limit to our patience on this. I'd just simply the secretary would very much appreciate being given the support he needs while he carries this through. It's not something that he has undertaken lightly or that he's not acutely aware of the considerations you're raising. But we're at a delicate moment here, and it's his judgment that it's continuing to be worth pursuing on the diplomatic front, and I obviously concur with that, and I hope members of the committee will as well.

REP. ENGEL: I want to just ask one last question about the occupation of Lebanon. I really believe that for far too long we've acquiesced in the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Without any justification, we have sometimes seen Syria as a force for stability there, and in my mind it's absolutely crazy. Syria has permitted Palestinian terror groups to run amuck in Lebanon and allows Hezbollah to menace northern Israel. And further, rather than reduce tensions in Lebanon, I believe it only plays off on faction against another, creating more strife. The former prime minister of Lebanon, General Michel Aoun, rightfully, in my opinion, calls Syria, and I'm quoting from him, quote, "the arsonist and the fireman," unquote, because Syria puts out fires it starts to falsely appear responsive to American and Western concerns.

So, I want to ask you, in relation to that, is it U.S. policy that Syria must withdraw from Lebanon? And if not, when are we going to draw the line that Syria must end its occupation of Lebanon? And if so, under what grounds must they withdraw from Lebanon -- the Taif Accord, U.N. Security Council Resolution 520, the U.N. Charter? And I mentioned before that it breaks my heart that Lebanon, a charter member of the U.N. is currently occupied and really has no sovereignty. So, I'd like to ask you that about the occupation of Lebanon.

MR. BOLTON: Well, it certainly remains the administration's position that Lebanon should have its full sovereignty restored and that all of those agreements have to be complied with. The subject of Syrian forces in Lebanon, the subject of Syrian support for terrorist groups with bases in Lebanon -- all of those things were raised by Secretary Powell and were put very directly to the Syrian leadership, remain on the table, as I've -- as I've said before.

REP. ENGEL: Thank you.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much. And now, for our last round of questioning, Mr. Chabot.

REP. CHABOT: Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mr. Secretary, relative to your statement, which, of course, has been reported on the news a number of times, about Syria permitting volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack and kill our service members, could you expound upon that and tell us any additional details that you could in this open environment?

MR. BOLTON: Well, I'm afraid there's really not much more I can say here in the open session. This is something that, as you know, Secretary Rumsfeld and others have been quite concerned about because of the obvious risk to coalition forces and indeed to international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private businesses operating in Iraq today. And it's a very high priority -- it's one of the most important elements of Secretary Powell's presentation to the Syrians back in May.

REP. CHABOT: Thank you. Relative to Hezbollah and the Lebanese connection and support -- I mean, there's no question that the stability and peace in the Middle East, and specifically with respect to Israel in the Palestinians, affects not only that region but the whole world, and I think Syria's continued support of Hezbollah has been particularly unhelpful in that area. Has there been any positive things that can be said relative to Syria getting the message that they need to stop that support, or does it continue to -- does it continue to occur as it has for years and years now?

MR. BOLTON: Well, I think the response from Syria on a variety of fronts to what Secretary Powell has said has been disappointing, and there's no question about that. But he continues to pursue the possibility of getting additional Syrian action. And as long as that possibility is there, as I say, it's -- it's not -- it's not conducive, I think, to the continuing playing out of those efforts that we say anything more on a public basis about what the Syrians are up to. But the secretary was unambiguous in his conversations with the Syrian leadership on this point.

REP. CHABOT: Okay. Thank you. I'm going to save the rest of my questions for the closed session.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. And in the typical way, he runs over his five minutes, and then he insists on having the last word any way. Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: It's an East Coast thing, actually. Briefly, but key to this ongoing discussion, there has been a lot of criticism and questioning about the level of intelligence, the quality of intelligence, and the massaging of intelligence vis-a-vis Iraq. And I believe everybody presently here at this panel has been supportive of the president and so voted. How certain are we of the things that you have told us, without getting into at this meeting specific intelligence, that the reports are accurate, not exaggerated -- the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, et cetera?

MR. BOLTON: In Iraq or in Syria?

REP. ACKERMAN: In Syria.

MR. BOLTON: I can assure you that with respect both to the unclassified testimony which I have delivered and the prepared classified statement which -- which has been delivered to the committee, that the judgments that are expressed there have been reviewed and commented on by everybody with a stake in the issue within the executive branch. And there are frequently difficult judgments that we have to make based on incomplete information, but the -- what I've said both in public session and what I'll say in more detail in the private session about Syria's weapons of mass destruction program, is something that there's very broad and deep agreement on within the -- both the policy and the intelligence communities of our government.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Madam Chairman.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. Nothing "sexed-up" here, Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Bolton. We'll go to our classified hearing. And this subcommittee is now adjourned.

END.

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