Approaching the end of 1996, the Middle East may well be on the verge of a major regional war. Numerous sources in the region report that the supreme leaders -- both civilians and military -- in most Arab states, as well as in Iran and Pakistan are convinced that the present vulnerability of Israel is so great that there is a unique opportunity to, at the very least, begin the process leading to the destruction of Israel. These circumstances are considered to be a historic window of opportunity the Muslim World should not miss. Therefore, these Muslim leaders have finalized numerous strategies and tactical alliances heretofore non-existent in the region.

Toward this end, several Arab states, as well as Iran and Pakistan, have been engaged in a frantic military build-up and active preparations in the last few months. Indeed, this crisis is escalating even as all key players continue to reassert their commitment to the US-inspired "Peace Process". However, the slide to war is the real and dominant dynamics in the Near East because it represents the reaction of the Muslim World to the challenges of modernization -- exacerbated and aggravated by the post-Gulf Crisis regional dynamics, and particularly the intrusion policy of the Clinton Administration toward the Hub of Islam.

In late November 1996, Na'il Mukhaybar, one of the most authoritative Arab commentators on Middle East affairs observed: "The question is no longer: Will the expected and planned war between Israel and Syria ever break out? It is rather: When will the war break out?" This is not a minority opinion. It is also shared by senior officials in the Arab Middle East.

For example, in late October, a senior Jordanian diplomat warned that "Syria is preparing for a surprise military attack on Israel in the coming weeks." This assessment was based on high-level contacts between Damascus and Amman, especially between senior officers of both armies, in which the military situation in the region was discussed. In these meetings the Syrians asked for passive and indirect support from the Jordanian military -- for Jordan to hold maneuvers near Israeli border in order to compel IDF to divert forces and hold them there.

Many other Arab and Iranian officials share the same view. There is a commonly shared firm belief among the senior experts serving Middle Eastern governments that the political-strategic dynamics in the Middle East have already reached a deadlock that makes a dramatic breakout inevitable. The strong commitment to such a dramatic breakout among most senior leaders is the key to understanding the present dangers. These leaders see no alternative to a dramatic breakout possible only through cataclysmic violence. The mere revival of the ongoing processes -- be it the peace process on the Arabs' terms or even the return to a region-wide state of war -- will no longer suffice to meet the strategic challenges from Islamic revivalism. Hence, the slide toward the resumption of violence -- ranging from spectacular terrorism to an all-out war -- between the Arabs and Israel. This is a very prudent and reasonable assessment given the overall regional dynamics over the last few months, particularly if examined in the context of the strategic regional dynamics of the last couple of years. Essentially, in their entirety, the tactical and military developments of recent months reinforce and confirm the earlier strategic posturing. Therefore, these military activities can, and should, be perceived as implementation of earlier grand designs. And this complementary relationship between the strategic and tactical dynamics is the key to the alarmist approach to interpreting the unfolding events. When analyzing these unfolding developments, it is highly significant to recall the emerging mega-trends in the region:

The rise of militant Islam as the primary motivating factor of the Arab public has already reached unprecedented levels. The popular mistrust in existing nation-states, the hostility toward the US/West over intervention and presence in the Muslim World (in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.), and the pressure on those in power to pursue "Islamic policies" continue to markedly increase. It will be difficult for rulers to resist the growing popular outcry and stay out of a major crisis with Israel, let alone support the US under such circumstances. The present leaders of Iran, Syria and Iraq are determined to transfer power to their sons-and-heirs. They are convinced that only the emergence of a close alliance leading to a perpetual crisis against the rest of the world will rally the potential contenders in their own respective coteries to accept their chosen sons as leaders. The mere existence of a functioning militant block will enable the other "sons-of" to assist and save a "son-of" in distress. Given its popular Islamist connotations -- liberating al-Quds - the current policy of brinkmanship and crisis is the best possible starting point for the establishment of this block. The succession struggle in Saudi Arabia is peaking. The Abdallah faction is determined to seize power through the eviction of the US from the region, the solution of Saudi Arabia's shortage of cash by accepting more lucrative contracts with East Asia at the expense of the West, and by establishing close relations with the radical states as a guarantee against Islamist subversion. The very close Abdallah-Assad relations constitute the key to Prince Abdallah's rise to power. These relations have already initiated the bombing in Dahran. Prince Abdallah has already promised Damascus to deliver a comprehensive oil embargo against the West in case of a major crisis with Israel.

Thus, the mega-trends in the Middle East are pushing toward a crisis environment. A dramatic breakout from the deadlock is virtually inevitable. The latest developments in the military threat to Israel fit perfectly into this overall trend.

The War Scenario

The Syrians and their allies have well defined contingency plans. The basic Syrian approach to a major war is based on the contingency plans prepared and exercised for the war that almost was in the Fall of 1992, while the plans for a strategic grab in a limited war are based on contingency plans prepared in 1994, and exercised since then.

Israeli security sources describe the 1994 contingency plan for a quick territorial grab on the Golan in the context of a limited war. The first step is the deployment of Commando forces to advance positions near the Israeli border. Then, once Damascus determines that hostilities are imminent, the Syrians will begin the moving around of SSMs inside Syria to reduce vulnerability to Israeli preemption or retaliation. The attack by the Commando forces on key objectives in the Israeli tactical depth will be followed immediately by an offensive surge of tank heavy forces. At the same time, other major Syrian units will be rushing toward the Golan in order to deter Israel from escalation and a massive counter-attack. Damascus intends to complete all these moves within 24-48 hours. Then, with Syrian forces still holding a small part of the Golan and a few Israeli POWs, Damascus and the Arab World will call for international pressure on Israel to impose cease fire, and to demonstrate "flexibility" and "realism" in negotiations with Syria.

Numerous Syrian, Iranian and Lebanese sources provided data that enables the reconstruction of the Syrian contingency plans for a major war. The first step will be a provocation launched from Lebanon – a "Lebanese" attack on the SLA and/or a major Hizballah operation against an Israeli strategic target and/or a spectacular terrorist strike at the heart of Israel. As planned, such a provocation is bound to instigate a major Israeli "response" in Lebanon. Since, because of the nature of the Syrian deployment in south Lebanon, Syrian troops will be killed in any such an Israeli retaliatory strike, Damascus will thus be in a position to call the Israeli actions an unacceptable aggression and threat to Damascus.

The Syrians will then have the "justification" to "retaliate" by launching a barrage of SSMs against Israeli cities and key military facilities. Meanwhile, in solidarity with Palestinian victims in south Lebanon, the PLO's 50,000 "police" and "auxiliaries" will launch a massive "intifadah" and a wave of terrorism from their safe-havens in the territories. Taken together, these activities will prove sufficient to prevent a timely deployment of Israeli reserves to the Golan.

By then, however, the Syrian Armed Forces will have already launched a surprise surge largely based on the 1994 contingency plan. Given the Israeli inability to react, the Syrian forces will succeed in securing limited grabs on the Golan. Then, Damascus and its allies are convinced, international pressure -- especially, if there are also oil embargo and Egyptian threat to intervene militarily -- will compel Israel to reach a political compromise on their terms.

Meanwhile, in case of an Israeli refusal to compromise, and hence a failure with the diplomatic initiative, the Syrians will be in position to impose a major escalation with the arrival of the main Syrian forces, as well as the sizable Iraqi and Iranian expeditionary forces. Now surging also through Jordan, these forces will vastly expand and enlarge the Eastern front.

Given Badr-96, the mere war preparations in Egypt, will, at the very least, compel the IDF to keep forces on the southern border, just to be safe. Moreover, building pressure in the Arab/Muslim World for all governments and peoples to join the Jihad or face popular uprisings because of their "un-Islamic" posture will most likely entice such governments as Egypt's and Jordan's to join the war rather than risk overthrow. Meanwhile, led by Saudi Arabia, the Muslim World will declare oil embargo. There are sufficient Islamist terrorists all over the West to launch a wave of terrorism in Europe and the US in order to prevent (or delay) US assistance to Israel.

With the militarily debilitating winter weather coming very soon, this scenario is all the more tempting from a strategic point of view. Given the adverse opening conditions and initial period of war, as well as the sudden escalation of the Arab-Iranian offensive, it is safe to assume that it will take the IDF more than a few days to repel all the Arab-Iranian forces from Israeli territory. Damascus, Tehran, Cairo and Baghdad believe that it is not inconceivable that a marked deterioration in the weather will slow down the Israelis before their counter-attacks could evict the Arab-Iranian forces from the Golan Heights. The Arabs and Iranians are convinced that the consequent virtual pause in the mobile war and severe limitations on the use of the Israeli Air Force will create both an opportunity and an incentive for the international community to pressure Israel into capitulation before the spring weather creates proper conditions for the resumption of a major mobile war.

Assessment

When dealing with the Third World, and particularly the Middle East, one should leave the Crystal Ball under lock and key. Given the dominant power of the personality of individual leaders as the source of decision-making -- based on these leaders' own reading of the situation on the basis of the information they have and believe in – and given the penchant of these leaders for the "conspiracy" theories and susceptibility to the "straw factor" (a small and at time relatively insignificant input pushes the leader into a major decision he has been procrastinating on -- the straw that breaks the camel's back), it is virtually impossible to accurately predict what any of the dominant leaders involved in this crisis will ultimately do. However, it is possible to point out to emerging and dominant trends in the crisis management.

Starting the current crisis, the principal leaders may not have wanted war. At the least, they were wavering about it. Since the late 1980s, Arab leaders have been reluctant to embark on major undertakings against Israel. However, these Arab leaders are also convinced that a major brinkmanship crisis, the return to a no-war-no-peace tense situation, and even the resumption of limited clashes, are a must to their own survival. These leaders also know that any of these measures can quickly escalate into a major war. Hence, their undertaking these steps means that these Arab leaders are fully ready to meet the possibility of a major war.

One reason for the readiness to face war, as opposed to the reluctance shown previously, is the Muslim World's reading of Israel. Indeed, most senior leaders (especially in Damascus, Tehran, Baghdad and Cairo) are convinced that Israel is falling apart -- collapsing from within in a unique state of self-confusion, of having lost the WILL to fight and survive. Hence, the current crisis is unfolding in the context of a historical window of opportunity to resolve the Zionist menace once and for good. In this context, the extent of the populist power of Islam -- as reflected in the return to Islamic traditions in all aspects of life in the Hub of Islam, in the increasing Islamic profile of the supreme leaders -- over national security decisions is a major yet un-quantifiable factor. There should be no doubt that the most important leaders are strongly influenced by their Islamic heritage and their own legacy and historical contribution to the Islamic "cause". Hence, the lure of the possibility to liberate al-Quds and destroy Israel may be a far stronger an input to their decision making process than what cold logic would have. Considering the building Islamist pressure to destroy Israel under any conditions, the Arab and Iranian leaders who are determined to hold to power may find these circumstances too tempting to be passed over.

Meanwhile, on a more pragmatic and realistic level, the fear of Israel's military might has shrunk. These leaders, particularly in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran, are fully aware of the escalatory potential of their move -- the initiation of major brinkmanship and crisis. They know that a crisis of the magnitude and potential strategic impact they are instigating can easily escalate to a major regional war. But now, they have the nuclear umbrella. Arab strategic studies, as well as the unprecedented magnitude of development and acquisition of SSMs and all types of weapons of mass destruction, show that this factor is high on the leaders' mind. This newly found sense of self-confidence and the firm belief in the ability to succeed in the initial phase of a war create a new, and worrisome, framework within which these leaders examine the choices ahead of them.

Further more, at the higher political levels of the entire Arab World, and most significantly in Cairo, Amman and other capitals considered relatively supportive of the "peace process", there is a distinct and marked change in the attitude towards Israel. The present attitude is more hostile and confrontational, and the resort to force is no longer ruled out as being anathema in the era of a "peace process". This widespread acceptability of the possibility of war encourages these leaders who are committed to conflict. The Egyptians now talk about a state of "cold war" between Israel and its Arab partners to peace -- a fundamental change from the previous term of "cold peace". Other political-military forces in Egypt call for the pursuit of policies of "armed peace" and even "confrontational peace" toward Israel.

Taken together, the multitude of political, strategic and tactical moves leave no doubt that the key leaders in the Arab World and Iran have already determined to continue the escalatory brinkmanship even as the likelihood of war is growing. Moreover, the overall situation and dynamics in the Arab Middle East contribute to a self-reinforcing escalation. Hence, the three key leaderships in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran, as well as Cairo and the Abdallah faction in Riyadh, are increasingly convinced that war is essentially inevitable. Consequently, there is already a clear shift in these leaders' deliberations and consultations. They are now preoccupied mainly with strategic and military decisions -- that is, determining the optimal conditions for initiating the war, achieving surprise despite the protracted escalatory crisis and Israel's edginess, etc.

However, there is no hard evidence, yet, of a specific decision to start something on a fixed date. Presently, the prevailing mood among the political, military and security elite in the Arab World is that of an almost passive, though willing, acceptance of fate's course. As the region continues to deteriorate towards an eruption of violence, they are waiting for the inevitable spark to emerge and "compel" them into taking action. Among the supreme leaders that really count, the "straw" seems to be still missing. But for how long?

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